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COURT OF APPEALS, 1959 TERM
labeling the indictment so misled the defendant that he was induced to plead
guilty to the acts described when he would otherwise have entered a plea of
not guilty had the misdemeanor been so labeled. In branding the trial court's
action in this instance an abuse of discretion, the Court has gone to unusual
lengths to affirm a right, the denial of which remains doubtful.
PROOF OF FALSE REPRESENTATIONS INADMISSIBLE UNLESS ALLEGED IN INDICT-
MENT.
Defendant's conviction for first degree grand larceny was reversed and a
new trial ordered by the Appellate Division on the ground that testimony con-
cerning false representations made by defendant was improperly admitted in
absence of an allegation in the indictment that defendant made use of any
false representations 3 4 The Court of Appeals, in People v. Palen unanimously
affirmed this result. 35
In 1942, Section 1290 of the Penal Law was passed thereby abolishing
"... the subtle and confusing distinctions that had previously differentiated the
various types of theft."36 Section 1290-a, however, required any false represen-
tations to be alleged if (and only if) the crime was "effected" thereby, that is, if
the crime was one that previously would have been prosecuted as "obtaining
money by false pretenses." Since this, in effect, continued the distinction between
obtaining money by false pretenses and the other forms of common law larceny
which the Legislature had sought to abolish, Section 1290-a was amended in
1950.37 This Section now provides that if ... defendant made use of any false
or fraudulent representation or pretense in the course of accomplishing, or in
aid of, or in facilitating the theft, evidence thereof may not be received at the
trial unless the indictment or information alleges such a representation or pre-
tense. Thus, the pleading requirement is extended to any theft situation, not
merely those amounting to "obtaining money by false pretenses".
Testimony was introduced in the present case to show that the defendant
had represented to his victim that he had a balance in his bank account of
$6,000, when in truth it was only $2.50, and had pretended to make an arrange-
ment with the bank whereby the complainant could leave his Veterans Admini-
stration check with the bank for "safekeeping". Although the crime did not
amount to obtaining money by false pretenses at common law, the Court felt
these were false representations which defendant "made use of" in accomplish-
ing the theft. Since they were not alleged in the indictment, the Court held that
Section 1290-a required a reversal of the conviction. The decision is a judicial
confirmation of the plain language of the section, making clear that the applica-
34. People v. Palen, 7 A.D.2d 791, 181 N.Y.S.2d 9 (3d Dep't 1959).
35. 7 N.Y.2d 107, 195 N.Y.S.2d 829 (1959).
36. People v. Karp, 298 N.Y. 213, 216, 81 N.E.2d 817, 118 (1948).
37. See New York State Legislative Annual, 54-55 (1950); People v. Lobel, 298
N.Y. 243, 82 N.E2d 145 (1948).
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tion of 1290-a is not limited to prosecutions which would have formerly been
"obtaining money by false pretenses".
REFUSALS TO ANSWER QUESTIONS CONCERNING SAMM SUBJECT MATTER CON-
STITUTE A SINGLE CONTEMPT
In one of the numerous cases arising out of the so-called "Apalachin meet-
ing" of November 1957, the Court of Appeals reversed and remitted for resen-
tence the conviction of the defendant in People v. Riela.38 The defendant, Riela,
was called as a witness before the Grand Jury investigating the meeting which
he and some sixty others had attended at the country estate of the late foseph
Barbara in Apalachin, New York. He refused to answer seventeen questions
concerning that meeting on the ground that to do so might tend to incriminate
him. He again refused to answer all seventeen questions when he was granted
immunity pursuant to Section 2447 of the New York Penal Law.39
Because of his refusal to answer although granted immunity, he was in-
dicted, convicted, 40 and sentenced for seventeen separate crimes of contempt in
violation of New York Penal Law Section 600.41 On each of the 17 counts he
received a sixty day sentence, to be served concurrently, and a fine of $250,
making a total fine of $4250.
Defendant appealed unsuccessfully to the Appellate Division,42 and finally
brought his case to the Court of Appeals. Riela defended his refusal to answer
on the ground that the immunity granted him was not broad enough to assure
him the protection guaranteed by the Constitution.
The Court brushed this objection aside and pointed out that it was clear
under current decision, that a witness may be compelled to answer in a state
proceeding, as long as the immunity granted by the state protects against
prosecution under its laws, even though it may not protect against prosecution
by the federal government or by other states.
In remitting the case for resentence, the Court of Appeals in a unanimous
opinion reversed sixteen of the seventeen counts, holding that defendant's re-
fusal to answer the seventeen questions constituted a single contempt of court
and not seventeen separate offenses. The Court found that the defendant had
38. 7 N.Y. 571, 200 N.Y.S.2d 43 (1960).
39. (1). In any investigation or proceeding where by express provision of a
statute, a competent authority is authorized to confer immunity, if a person refuses
to answer a question or produce evidence of any kind on the ground that he may
be incriminated thereby, and, notwithstanding such a refusal, an order is made by
such competent authority that such person answer the question or produce the
evidence, such person shall comply with the order. If such person complies with
the order, and if, but for this section he would have been privileged to withhold
the answer given or the evidence produced by him, then immunity shall be con-
ferred upon him, as provided for herein.
40. 14 Misc. 2d 213, 178 N.Y.S.2d 873 (County Ct. 1958).
41. A person who commits a contempt of court, of any one of the following
kinds is guilty of a misdemeanor: . . . (6). Contumacious and unlawful refusal
to be sworn as a witness, or, after being sworn, to answer any legal and proper
interrogatory; ....
42. 9 A.D.2d 481, 195 N.Y.S.2d 558 (3d Dep't 1959).
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